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sacrifice educated one or more of their children 555
in the Classics in order to obtain immediate prestige in the eyes of the community and with the hope of eventual success in the examinations, which might lead to an official position and enrichment of the family fortune. Thus, education contributed to the upward movement of the families, be they of the landlord, merchant, or bureaucrat groups. On the other hand, the 558
allocation of family income to the support of one or more unproductive persons through years of study, with no assurance of economic returns, often dissipated the fortune of the family and led to the loss of economic status. Too, the belief that those who used their brains were superior to those who used their brawn contributed to the scholars' contempt for manual skills and commercial activity. Therefore, if a scholar did not pass the examination or, having passed it, failed to obtain official appointment, and if the successive divisions of his family property reduced his own holdings to a small plot, he would find it difficult to improve his economic status. At the same time, his lack of economic means would deprive his children of the opportunity to study. Thus, the scholar ideal also contributed to the downward movement of families in the social hierarchy.

The scholars, therefore, are not to be re- 517 •
garded as a separate class or a separate occupational group, except as they relied for their livelihood on the teaching profession or the use of their literary skills in a clerical capacity, but rather as "leisurely" members of families of

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varying degrees of wealth of the bureaucratic, agricultural, artisan, or commercial classes. When recruited by the government to study at the imperial academies, scholars were protégés of the government, and were regarded as potential bureaucrats even if they were engaged only in the compilation of historical documents. Certainly the majority of those who devoted their full time to study considered themselves potential bureaucrats. To those who did not cherish the dream of becoming bureaucrats and who had other economic means, education was only an additional sign of their prestige.

The road to status and wealth through education and government service was often bypassed in time of chaos; military skills would enable individuals to obtain high positions in the bureaucracy. But military men seldom won social esteem until they had become cultivated, and such esteem generally accrued to their children, who were given the opportunity by reason of the parents' wealth to acquire learning under the tutelage of well-known scholars.

C. Social Organizations

Social organizations which had no basis in kinship were not recognized as approved parts of the social hierarchy or as approved means for gaining social prominences. However, they would help to supplement relationships which the social order might neglect. The sucess of organizations of this sort served as a disintegrating influence on the existing social system. Most

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always succeeded in giving new skills to the student, it at least had taught him not to be satisfied with his lot, but to look to the future rather than to the past for betterment. With the increase of schools, there emerged in the cities a considerable professional class and a large number of students cut off for years from their original environment. Students and intellectuals, seeking some common meeting ground, banded together, and with their newly-found organizations came a semblance of separate class consciousness. Although many students depended for their subsistence on their families, they had nothing to do with the cultivation or management of land. Alienated from the land and anxious to find a new channel of social advancement, the intellectuals were confronted with the problems of social disorder. Furthermore, in contrast to the situation in Europe during a comparable cultural period, when the landed aristocracy contested with the merchants, industrialists, and bankers for positions in the ruling elite, political power and economic power in modern China continued to be in the hands of a single group. When social mobility was made difficult by the lack of a clear and recognized channel for upward social movement, social roles were less clearly defined; the sons of high government officials became industrialists, bankers' sons became diplomats, and all owned land. Intermarriages between the new and the old upper-class elements were taken for granted. Modern intellectuals, mostly from middle-class families, were unable to obtain position and status in

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the new business or political hierarchy and yet were unwilling to return to their home villages. They had been too long removed from their original environment to feel anything but estranged from it.

Influenced by the idea of democracy which they had discovered in school, the intellectuals began to solicit support from the masses, a move which traditional scholars would not have considered. Robert North's study of Kuomintang and Communist leaders shows that the majority of them came from middle-class, land-owning, and merchant families and were graduates of modern schools.[10] The labor unions, the peasant associations, the rural reconstruction experiments, and the Communist Party became the milieu in which the intellectuals began their new careers.

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During this period of social and political disorder, military men began to gain power, obtaining offices by virtue of their military success. Rather than despising the military as the older scholars did, many intellectuals began to seek similar careers as a means to power. This tendency began with the opening of the Huang-p'u (Whampao) Military Academy in Kwangtung for the training of officers for the 1923-27 campaign against the warlords. In the

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10. Robert North, Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Elites, Stanford University Press, 1952, pp. 116-121.

every effort to make a marriage ceremony festive. Practical jokes were played on the bridegroom, traditional songs were sung, and the guests, particularly the men, thoroughly enjoyed themselves. The births of male children were often celebrated as were the initiations of boys into adulthood, betrothals, and the like. In modern times the government of the Republic of China has decreed certain national holidays, but these were little observed by the farm villages.

In addition to these occasions for relaxation, there were activities which interested some of the villagers and helped to vary their lives. Itinerant dramatic troupes occasionally performed, and the storyteller spinning out his tales to the villagers until very recently was often seen. The election of a headman for the village often involved political maneuvering and a town meeting. Pilgrimages to famous mountains or shrines were often undertaken in the slack agricultural season for religious reasons or purely for relaxation. Perhaps the most universal recreation was, as in all illiterate communities, gossip and desultory conversation about the weather, the crops, the iniquity of the government, local disputes, and, on their rare occurrence, lawsuits involving fellow villagers. Despite the grim struggle for survival, the average villager tended to be cheerful, self-respecting, with a robust sense of humor. He went through life with a continuous concern for his own "face" or prestige among his fellows and with the strong determination that, despite all, the fortunes of his family might steadily improve.

C. Urban Life

City life, although it meant a different pattern of work, was closely akin to life in the villages. Town

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crease his family's land holdings is checked by fear lesthe be re-classified as a "rich peasant" and be subject to higher taxes and other pressures. Yet what the Communists deplore as the peasant's "spontaneous capitalistic tendency" has not been crushed, and the landholdings of the more enterprising grow in size.[15]

The effort to force various forms of co-operative work have not been completely successful.

> "...when a serious team-use of labor, tools, and farm animals was attempted, a variety of unsatisfactory results emerged; quarrels among the families interfered with efficient output; no one assumed responsibility for the upkeep of communal property; the claims of inefficient members violated the sense of equity of the more efficient..."[16]

Yet the villagers' way of life has been greatly altered by the intervention of the government, through the cadres, in all social, economic, and political activities. The pressure to conform, at least outwardly, is formidable. Self-chosen leisure time activities are few, meetings occupy a great deal of time, and attendance at harangues by Party cadres, entertainment furnished by traveling theatrical groups (all with their ideological message) take up more of his

15. Rostow, op. cit., p. 152, cites the Peking People's Daily, Feb. 15, 1954.

16. Rostow, op. cit., p. 84.

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leisure. The slack winter season may now find him in winter school or involved in a community work project directed by the local cadre.

Settlement of accounts before the New Year holiday now means payment of taxes and the sale to the government of most of the balance of the farmer's grain, for which he receives coupons. The cadres carry this out at the village level.[17] The New Year festival itself is characterized by some traditional acitivites, modified to promote government aims, and by some new features. The peasant may buy New Year's pictures to decorate his house, but they will probably be romanticized portraits of Mao and other Communist heroes rather than the colorful deities of former days.[18] He may decorate his gate with pai red mottoes, but the mottoes will no longer carry the old wishes for long life, happiness, and wealth, but exhortations to conform to Communist standards.[19] The government may allow some additional foods for the season, but gambling is forbidden, and social life is no longer restricted to family and friends. In Hunan, the peasants were urged to organize their own dramatic troupes to play the approved repertoire, and travelling troupes brought dramas to the villages. The cadres organized "cultural lectures" and mobile movie teams showed instructive films. The old exchange of visits with relatives in nearby towns now has its Communist counterpart: interchange of visits between urban and rural workers' groups to observe one another's progress in Communist reconstruction.[20]

17. SCMP 979, Feb. 2, 1955, p. 30.
18. Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23, 1955, p. 2.
19. Cf. the collection of mottoes in Hua-nan t'ung-shu, [South China Almanac], Canton, 1953, p. 32.
20. Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23, 1955, p. 2.

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add to the popularity of the Communist regime among the workers, in spite of the fact that such "benefits" remain largely promises.

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On the liability side of the Communist policy toward the worker are the lack of wage increases, a harsher work sechedule and loss of leisure time, and a visionary welfare program for the worker which the Communists themselves admit cannot be realized until the worker has worked still harder to produce still more. Thus the worker's attitude toward the government and its policy must depend on how much he believes in a glorious "tomorrow" and how well he can put up with the physical hardship of "today." The recent let-up in "labor emulation" drives and the sudden flurry of official warnings against driving the worker too hard appear to indicate that the laboring class is showing signs of possible exhaustion. In addition, the worker's attitude may also be greatly influenced by the rise of a new managerial class which is being fostered by the Communists and which, for whatever reasons, receives better treatment than do those who work on the production line.

C. Students and Intellectuals

Of all the groups of people in China, the intellectuals are probably the most varied in their attitudes. They do not constitute a "class," hence their attitudes do not show any distinctive "group" characteristics. There are those whose strong convictions make them active leaders of social and political movements in defiance of authoritarian rule; there are others whose education and experience make them flexible under pressure. Hence no dependable conclusion on the attitudes of the Chinese intellectuals as a group has been arrived at.

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Though the attitudes of Chinese intellectuals differ, the great majority of them are exceedingly patriotic. It is therefore conceivable that to some of them at least the Communist emphasis on loyalty to the state rather than the traditional loyalty to the family must have a great appeal. There is reason to believe that most of them who accepted Communism in 1949 did so because they saw in the Communist program some hope of restoring China to a position of dignity among nations. After five years of Communist rule, some of the intellectuals are probably elated by the truculence with which Red China has been conducting its foreign affairs, and by the feeling that China, at long last, has been unified and become a nation of importance. But on the negative side there are the restrictions on intellectual freedom imposed by the Communists. Furthermore, the Communist policy of gradually substituting the freshly trained and well-indoctrinated intellectuals for those who have had a "liberal" or "conservative" background must have created a sense of insecurity among many.

Traditionally, Chinese intellectuals aspired to high positions in government where they might attain wealth, social esteem, and influence. For those intellectuals still harboring such personal ambitions, it must be heartening to see people with no seniority in either the Party hierarchy or the government bureaucracy among the ranks of the nation's leaders in all fields. For others, who have modified their personal ambitions and who sincerely wish to make their training useful to the country, something they have not been able to do for many years in the past, Peking's policy of finding a place for intellectuals in the national reconstruction program is a welcome move.

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The Communists have counted on the enthusiastic support of students. From among the students the Communists recruit their loyal cadres. Exposure to regimentation may lessen the student enthusiasm for the Communist regime. Although anti-Communist sources in Hong Kong have reported a sharp decrease in the number of overseas Chinese students returning to the Mainland, the fact that some continue to return to China indicates the strong appeal of Communist ideology to literate Chinese youth. The Communists, however, may be expecting too much of their program of indoctrination; the young may give loyal support to a totalitarian regime, but it is unlikely that they can entirely suppress a simultaneous impulse toward individualism.

D. Businessmen and Industrialists

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Few industrialists are left in Communist China today, but small-business men and manufacturers, who have made up the larger part of China's urban population continue to exist, although in reduced number. The merchant has always occupied an inferior position in traditional Chinese social strata, while industry is something relatively new and its position in Chinese society has yet to be clearly defined. In general, merchants and manufacturers, who had operated under government restrictions even in pre-Communist days, are cool-headed realists. They are not easily swayed by high-sound-phrases. There have been few occasions when symbols of state could evoke intimate sentiment among the merchants and small manufacturers, except, perhaps, at a time when foreign goods flooded the Chinese market and caused dislocation of the Chinese economy.

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of the State Council, 1,268 corruption cases involving 1,826 people were prosecuted during the first six months of 1954.[31] The 1955 Supervisory Conference devoted a great deal of attention to a study of this issue.[32] A flood of reports on corruption and waste appeared in the Communist press. One of the most serious cases involved the Mining and Geological School in Changsha, Hunan Province, which was accused of misuse of government rations. The school was reported to have wasted rice rations and falsified personnel statements in an effort to obtain more government rations.[33]

All of these reports indicate that, despite persistent efforts to eradicate corruption, abuses both in and outside the government continue to occur.

III. TENSION AND DISCONTENT

Extreme centralization and control of governmental, economic, and social activities logically lead to discontent and tension. If not checked in time, these undercurrents of public dissatisfaction may create a real threat to the government.

A. Public Discontent

1. Restrictions on Private Life

In Central-South China, as in all other regions of China, the individual citizen cannot choose how his day is spent; a fixed schedule has been imposed on him. After his working hours, the peasant, for

31. Ta-kung Pao, Tientsin, Mar. 24, 1955, p. 1.
32. For report on conference, see Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], Peking, June 14, 1955, p. 1.
33. Ta-kung Pao, Tientsin, Mar. 16, 1955, p. 1.

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instance, is required to attend meetings, enroll in winter or night schools, and participate in other group activities prescribed by the government. He must accept Party counsel on how to lead his daily life and how to spend his money. These impositions are time-consuming and irritating to those who must endure them.

Labor discipline controls all working hours. Any violation of discipline may provoke servere penalties. Technical schools, cultural classes and other group activities have been arranged for every worker. Since most workers hold membership in a number of Communist-led organizations, such multiple obligations leave them little leisure time, and their days pass in weariness and discontent.

2. Tax Burden and Business Restrictions

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In the rural districts, the Communist San Ting Policy, formulated at the end of 1953, fixes quotas for farm production, purchasing, and marketing. This policy has aroused resentment. Measures which regulate the sale of farm surplus products -- mainly rice and cotton -- to the centralized market, also meet resistance. But the measure which has provoked the most discontentment among the farmers is "deduction for services rendered by the government to the farmers." During the conversion of the old currency, the Communists in Kwangsi Province admitted that nine deductions were imposed on income.[34] These deductions included shares for the credit co-operatives, shares for the supply and marketing co-operatives, repayment of loans, bond subscriptions, and other items.

34. People's Daily, Peking, March 3, 1955, p. 3.